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According to the family investment hypothesis (FIH), married women in credit-constrained
households participate in the labor market to ￿nancially sustain their families. We show
that a simple two-period labor supply model produces testable implications for the oc-
cupational choices and work hours of married women. The test requires that the sample
be con￿ned to women working in dead-end jobs that do not necessarily involve much
skill. Our results, based on the matched March Current Population Survey, support
the FIH. We also ￿nd that the previous U.S. results which refute the FIH are reversed
when the con￿ned sample is used.
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11 Introduction
This paper analyzes the labor market behavior of family members in credit-constrained or liquidity-
constrained households. In credit-constrained households, some family members participate in the
labor market to ￿nancially sustain their families. However, these family members would have
not worked if their families were not under constraints. As a consequence, the labor supply
provided by these family members usually takes the form of working in dead-end jobs that do
not necessarily require much skill and will decrease as their families overcome credit constraints.
These predictions enable one to test the family investment hypothesis (FIH) by comparing the
labor supply of secondary workers in credit-constrained families with that in families that are not
credit-constrained.
In the literature, researchers have found a simple way of identifying out credit-constrained
families from those who are not by exploiting the immigration status of families.1 A common
assumption made is that recent immigrant families are more likely to be credit-constrained than
native families or other immigrant families who arrived earlier.2 This assumption is made because,
upon entry to the United States, source country skills are not perfectly transferable and immigrants
need time to re￿ne their skills and learn about the U.S. labor market. This circumstance gives rise
to specialization among couples where primary workers (usually husbands) invest in acquiring U.S.
speci￿c skills and secondary workers (usually wives) take on low-skill jobs to sustain their families
in the interim.3 Once primary workers begin to assimilate into the U.S. labor market, secondary
workers reduce their work hours or withdraw from the labor force.
We study the FIH for three reasons. First, it helps policy makers to understand the labor market
behavior of family members in credit-constrained, not limited to immigrant, households. Second,
while a large literature investigates the FIH (e.g., Long, 1980; Baker and Benjamin, 1997; Blau,
1We use the terms ￿foreign-born person￿and ￿immigrant￿interchangeably. Our sample possibly includes aliens
in an illegal status.
2Analyses based on this assumption, however, will fail if one cannot separate the e⁄ects of credit-constraints from
other e⁄ects that are speci￿c to immigrants￿experiences. Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004) discuss that imperfect
skill transferability, cultural di⁄erences in family roles with respect to working, or non-random migration decisions
may cause the behavior of immigrants and natives to di⁄er.
3An exception is Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004). They allow the possibility of female primary workers and
male secondary workers.
2Kahn, Moriarty, and Souza, 2003; Cobb-Clark and Crossley, 2004; among others), the testing
procedure has not been formally established by economic theory. Cohen-Goldner, Gotlibovski,
and Kahana (2009a) is an exception, but our approach presents a much simpler model. Third,
the evidence of the FIH has been controversial. While Baker and Benjamin (hereafter, BB), using
the 1986 and 1991 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances, ￿nd that foreign-born women￿ s labor
supply patterns are consistent with the FIH; Blau, Kahn, Moriarty, and Souza (hereafter, BKMS),
using the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data, ￿nd no support for the FIH.
This study improves upon previous research in several ways. First, we present a two-period
labor supply model for married women that provides new testable implications for the occupational
choices and work hours of married women. Married women with low productivity and low taste
for work do not participate in the labor market unless their families are credit-constrained. Among
these women, more immigrant females participate in the labor market since their families are more
likely to be credit-constrained than native ones. As the credit-constraint problems get resolved,
more immigrant females in dead-end or low-skill jobs will drop out of labor force than their native
counterparts. A test of the FIH is, therefore, to examine the immigrant-native di⁄erence in the
occupation mobility and the labor supply of married women working in dead-end jobs in response
to increases in husband￿ s earnings and family non-labor income.
Second, previous studies test the FIH by comparing the average annual hours worked of foreign-
born women with those of native-born women without conditioning on their occupations or skills.
For example, BKMS (2003) ￿nd that immigrant women work less hours than comparable native
women upon arrival, but eventually work more hours than native women. The theory part of this
paper argues that the test has to be limited to immigrant and native women who work in dead-end
jobs. The role of dead-end jobs has been noted in most previous papers, but occupational status
has received little attention in testing the FIH. By replicating the previous speci￿cations using our
data, we show that we can reproduce the ￿ndings of other U.S. studies and that these results are
reversed when the sample is con￿ned to women working in dead-end jobs.
Third, to characterize the dynamic feature of occupation choices and labor supply, this pa-
per uses longitudinal data, the matched March Current Population Survey (CPS). It consists
3of multiple two-year panels. To specify occupation choices, we ￿t a ￿rst-order Markov switching
model with three occupation states (not working, working in dead-end jobs, and working in career-
oriented jobs). We explicitly investigate whether foreign-born women in dead-end jobs leave the
labor market or decrease their work hours with increased stay in the United States conditioning
on their spousal occupation status and earnings, family non-labor income, and own and spousal
demographic variables. The longitudinal nature of the data is valuable for use in the annual hours
worked speci￿cations because we can identify individuals who work in dead-end sectors in the ￿rst
year of the panel and observe their actual labor supply in the second year of the panel.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a two-period labor supply model for married
women, presents its implications for work hours and occupational choices, and reviews related
studies. Section 3 introduces the data sets used in this study. Section 4 proceeds with the empirical
speci￿cation of dynamic occupation choices and estimates the model. Section 5 replicates the
annual hours worked speci￿cation employed in the previous literature using our sample. We
compare the results from the full sample and the sample con￿ned to women in dead-end jobs.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Testing the Family Investment Hypothesis
2.1 Labor Supply of Married Women: Theory
This section presents a simple two-period labor supply model for married women, which produces
testable implications for the FIH. The labor market is competitive and o⁄ers two kinds of oc-
cupations. The ￿rst occupation is a career-oriented job. Individuals working in career-oriented
jobs earn w1 in the ￿rst period (when young) and w2 (> w1) in the second period (when old) if
they continue to work. Occupations in this category require that workers meet certain schooling,
training, and experience criteria. The second occupation is a dead-end job. The wages in dead-end
jobs are set to w0 regardless of labor market experience. Skills required for these occupations are
minimal.
We assume that the discounted lifetime earnings from working in career-oriented jobs are greater
4than those from working in dead-end jobs. That is, w1 + w2=(1 + r) > w0 + w0=(1 + r), where r
is the interest rate. However, there are two sources of costs associated with learning the required
skills for career-oriented jobs: pecuniary costs and disutility from e⁄ort in acquiring the skills. For
some women, these costs are higher than for others, and they choose to work in dead-end jobs.
We assume that husbands and wives are primary and secondary workers, respectively.4 All
males participate in the labor market, but there is selection among females. Women are heteroge-
neous. They have di⁄erent labor market productivity and preferences for leisure. For simplicity,
we consider four types of females: high/low productivity and high/low taste for work. Suppose
that, given the wage structure, high productivity (HP) and low productivity (LP) females work
in career-oriented and dead-end jobs, respectively, if they choose to work.5 For those who are not
working, their productivity types are not observed. Other things equal, females with high taste
for work (HW) are more likely to work than those with low taste for work (LW).







subject to an asset accumulation rule, where ct, lt, and xt are consumption, leisure, and observable
individual as well as husband and family variables in period t; ￿ is the taste for work parame-
ter; and ￿ represents the discount rate. The ￿rst order conditions are Uc (ct;lt;xtj￿) = ￿t and
Ul (ct;lt;xtj￿) ￿ ￿twt, for t = 1;2, and an Euler equation, where ￿t is the marginal utility of
wealth. From these equations, we obtain the labor supply function, ht (￿t;wt;xtj￿) ￿ 0, which is
increasing in ￿t and ￿.
We assume that a foreign-born female is more likely to face liquidity constraints than a native-
born female when she is young, but the constraints disappear as husband￿ s earnings and family
non-labor income grow. This implies that ￿t is likely to be larger for immigrants than natives for
4We abstract from bargaining within married couples.
5However, some highly productive females may take dead-end jobs at t = 1 due to severe liquidity constraints.
In this case, they cannot move to career-oriented jobs at t = 2 because they did not acquire human capital at t = 1.
As a result, their labor market behavior will be similar to those of LP females. To keep our discussion simple, we
classify this speci￿c group of highly productive females as LP females.
5t = 1;2, but ￿2 is su¢ ciently small even for immigrants. Under these conditions, some women, who
would otherwise not have worked, work in the ￿rst period because ￿1 is too high. In the second
period, these women reduce their labor supply or drop out of the labor force. The majority of these
women are LP-LW females. Since they have low ￿￿ s and receive low wage o⁄ers during their work
lives, they work in the ￿rst period when ￿1 is high and then reduce or quit their labor supply in
the second period because ￿2 is lower than ￿1. LP-HW females are likely to work in both periods
because they have high ￿. HP females are less likely to be a⁄ected by their non-labor income
because their life-time career decisions depend on the increasing wage structure of career-oriented
jobs. To test the FIH, one needs to examine the changes in the labor market behavior of LP-LW
females over time.
In practice, it is di¢ cult to separate LP-LW females from LP-HW females, although it is
possible to identify LP females among working females. Accordingly, we develop a test of the FIH
using working LP females. The FIH accompanied by a conventional assumption that immigrant
households are more likely to be credit-constrained provides the following two testable implications.
First, among females working in dead-end jobs in the ￿rst period, immigrant women are more likely
than native women to decrease their work hours in the second period. Second, among females
working in dead-end jobs in the ￿rst period, immigrant women are more likely to quit their jobs
in the second period relative to native women.
￿ Testable Implication 1. Among females currently working in dead-end jobs, immigrant
women are more likely than native women to decrease their work hours in the next period.
￿ Testable Implication 2. Among females currently working in dead-end jobs, immigrant
women are more likely to quit their jobs in the next period relative to native women.
Our testable implications are di⁄erent from those in previous studies. Earlier papers test the
￿rst implication for the FIH, but they use the entire female sample neglecting the importance of
distinguishing dead-end jobs from career-oriented jobs. In Section 5, we can compare two sets
of test results: one using the entire female sample and the other con￿ning the sample to working
females in dead-end jobs. The second implication concerns occupation choices and is a new testable
6implication. Section 4 presents these test results.
2.2 Previous Literature
This section reviews the existing literature on the FIH and the occupational choices of immigrant
women. Long (1980) documents negative correlation between years since migration and earnings
for married immigrants using the 1970 Census. He speculates that this may be because married
women in immigrant families initially work to provide ￿nancial support for their husbands￿human
capital investments required in U.S. labor market and then reduce their labor supply as their
husbands￿earnings rise with time in the United States. Subsequent studies have explicitly tested
this speculation and coined the term the Family Investment Hypothesis.
BB (1997) test the FIH against an alternative hypothesis, the pricing model, using the 1986
and 1991 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances. The pricing model explains the observed labor
supply pattern of immigrant women by the labor supply responses to each spouse￿ s wages. They
reject the pricing model based on the fact that their estimated hours/wage elasticities are too
large. They have tried to disentangle immigrant speci￿c e⁄ects by looking at the composition in
family nativity. They show that immigrant women married to native men, who are assumed to
not be credit-constrained, behave like native women.
BKMS (2003) use the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data and reject the FIH. They ￿nd that im-
migrant women work less hours than comparable natives upon arrival, but eventually overtake the
labor supply of natives, which con￿ icts with the FIH. They also ￿nd that the positive assimilation
pro￿les for women and men have similar magnitudes. Blau, Kahn, and Papps (2008), using the
1980, 1990, and 2000 Census data, ￿nd that source country characteristics impact the labor supply
assimilation pro￿les (annual hours worked) of immigrant wives, but not immigrant husbands.
Cohen-Goldner, Gotlibovski, and Kahana (2009b) provide the most recent evidence for the
FIH using the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census. They reject the FIH. They compare the labor market
outcomes between married and single immigrants with the assumption that under the FIH, only
married immigrant women ￿nance household consumption. Then, married women should work
longer on arrival and reduce their hours with continued stay in the host country relative to single
7immigrants. To account for bias due to selection into marriage, they use the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimator by comparing married and single natives.
Studies that test the FIH in other countries provide mixed results. Cobb-Clark and Crossley
(2004), using data from Australia, identify primary and secondary workers in immigrant families
based on ￿ points￿which are assigned in accordance to an individual￿ s skill set. They ￿nd support
for the FIH in households where the primary worker is male, but reject the FIH in households
where the primary worker is female. Basilio, Bauer, and Sinning (2009) do not support the FIH
based on data from West Germany. Cohen-Goldner, Gotlibovski, and Kahana (2009b) also use
the Israeli Labor Force Survey (LFS) and Income Survey (IS) for the years 1991-2004 and reject
the FIH in Israel.
There are studies that examine the occupational status of immigrants, but they do not link the
￿ndings to testing the FIH. Powers and Seltzer (1998) and Powers, Seltzer, and Shi (1998) analyze
the occupational status of undocumented migrants using data from the Legalized Population Sur-
veys. By comparing ￿rst jobs in the United States, occupations held at the time of legalization,
and occupations after legalization was granted, they ￿nd an upward trend in job quality. Akresh
(2006) and Akresh (2008) using data from the New Immigrant Survey (which follows immigrants
who have received their green cards) analyze last jobs held in their home country, ￿rst jobs in the
United States, and current jobs. She ￿nds that immigrants exhibit a U-shaped pattern of eco-
nomic assimilation: they experience downward mobility on arrival (￿rst job) and upward mobility
(current job) in their occupational status.
3 Data
3.1 The Job Zone Variable from the O*Net
We introduce an occupation state variable provided by the Occupational Information Network
database (O*Net). It is the Speci￿c Vocational Preparation (SVP) which the job zone variable
is based on. The SVP as de￿ned by the U.S. Department of Labor is the amount of lapsed time
required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facil-
8ities needed for average performance in a speci￿c job-worker situation. Speci￿c vocational training
includes vocational education, apprenticeship training, in-plant training, on-the-job training, and
essential experience in other jobs. The SVP score ranges from 1 to 9 (both inclusive). A job with
a SVP score of 1 requires a skill level that can be obtained by short demonstration. A job with a
SVP score of 9 requires at least 10 years of training.
We focus on jobs with SVP scores of less than 4. These jobs are de￿ned as job zone 1 occupa-
tions by the O*Net.6 These jobs require from no preparation to up to three months of training.
Job zone 1 occupations include a large number of less complex service occupations, as well as
materials handlers and machine/equipment tenders or operators. For example, these jobs include
amusement and recreation attendants, bartenders, counter and rental clerks, cashiers, highway
maintenance workers, couriers and messengers, lobby attendants, parking enforcement o¢ cers,
phlebotomists, refuse and recyclable material collectors, solderers, taxi drivers, ticket takers, ush-
ers, waiters/waitresses, and yard workers.
In this study, we classify dead-end jobs as the occupations with SVP scores less than 4 (or
job zone 1 occupations).7 Career-oriented jobs are the occupations with SVP scores greater than
or equal to 4 (or occupations in job zone 2 or above). We aggregate occupations in job zones 2
through 5 to keep our model simple. In sum, we consider three occupation states: not participating
in the labor market, working in dead-end jobs, and working in career-oriented jobs.
3.2 The Current Population Survey
The CPS is a monthly survey based on the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United
States. The CPS sample provides basic information on the demographic status and the labor force
situation of the population 16 years of age and older. The Annual Social and Economic Supplement
6The job zones range from 1 (occupations that need little or no preparation) to 5 (occupations that need extensive
preparation). For details, see Oswald, Campbell, McCloy, Rivkin, and Lewis (1999).
7We analyze the Mincer earnings regression for each job zone separately for the period 1996-2002 and ￿nd that
the returns to education and experience for job zone 1 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those of job zone 2 as classi￿ed
by the O*NET (results not shown). We ￿nd this di⁄erence in earnings growth between job zone 1 and 2 occupations
is consistent over time. For example, over 20 years, there is an earnings gap of $42,000 between job zones 1 and
2 assuming 40 hours/week and 48 weeks in a year. Hence, we categorize all jobs with SVP<4 (or job zone 1) as
dead-end jobs and job zone 2 and above as career-oriented jobs.
9of the CPS or the March CPS additionally provides data on labor market outcomes and income in
addition to the basic CPS sample. We exploit the longitudinal structure of the March CPS. Our
sample is a collection of two-year panels with overlapping periods, e.g. 1996-1997, 1997-1998, ...
, 2001-2002. The balanced part of the panel is called the matched March CPS.8
We collect data for 146,520 married foreign-born and native-born individuals (or 73,260 couples)
of ages 24-65 for 1996-2002.9 The sample consists of married couples with their spouses present in
the same addresses over the two year panel sample period. The sample excludes immigrants who
came to the United States before the age of 18 and who entered the U.S. before 1950. Arrival years
are given by intervals, so they are de￿ned to be the mid-points of each period. Then we drop 853
couples because we require both spouses to be not in the armed forces during the entire sampling
period. Another 2,313 couples are dropped because the job zone variable does not include some
of their occupation codes. We end up with 70,094 couples (63,857 native-native couples, 4,298
immigrant-immigrant couples, 1,126 immigrant women married to native men couples, and 813
native women married to immigrant men couples).10
3.3 Summary Statistics
We link the job zone variable to the matched March CPS. Table 1A tabulates the distribution of
occupation states for husbands and wives. Over 90% of married men were employed irrespective
of their wife￿ s job zone. About 73.7% of native husbands and 60.4% of immigrant husbands had
8A drawback of using the matched March CPS is its large attrition rate. We address this problem by applying
an attrition correcting method. The method assigns weights to the individuals in the balanced panel in such a way
that the weighted panel becomes a representative sample in each period. For details, see Bhattacharya (2008) or
Kim (2009a). To make our analysis robust, we make two separate approaches, one using and the other not using
attrition correcting weights. We ￿nd that the two sets of empirical ￿ndings are similar. This paper reports results
that do not use weights.
9The foreign sample includes foreign-born individuals who were not U.S. citizens at the time of birth. Following
Warren and Peck (1980), our foreign sample consists of persons born outside the United States, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the outlying areas of the United States. Foreign-born persons may have acquired U.S. citizenship
by naturalization or may be in illegal status. The reference group consists of native-born individuals. The native
sample includes persons born in the Unites States, but excludes persons born in the Puerto Rico and the outlying
areas.
10Credit-constraints are more likely to be binding for couples who move together at the time of immigration, but
this is not identi￿able in the CPS. Using a sample that includes only couples who married after migration would
make the results di¢ cult to interpret since marriage decisions are not exogenous and would result in less power to
detect the FIH. However, any signi￿cant result using this sample will serve as strong evidence for the FIH.
10career-oriented occupations and about 17.1% of native husbands and 31.0% of immigrant husbands
were in dead-end jobs. For married women, however, 23.9% of native wives and 38.6% of foreign-
born wives do not work. These facts are consistent with one of our assumptions, which is that
men and women are primary and secondary workers, respectively.
Table 1A. Occupation States
Wife
Not Working Dead-End Career-Oriented Total
Native Sample
Husband Not Working 4.1 1.4 3.7 9.2
Dead-End 4.0 4.3 8.9 17.1
Career-Oriented 16.0 9.7 48.0 73.7
Total 24.0 15.4 60.6 100.0
Immigrant Sample
Husband Not Working 4.4 2.3 1.9 8.6
Dead-End 12.6 12.2 6.2 31.0
Career-Oriented 21.8 11.9 26.7 60.4
Total 38.9 26.4 34.8 100.0
We ￿nd that the transition probabilities from dead-end jobs to not working status are sensitive
to husband￿ s earnings especially for immigrant women, which is consistent with the FIH. By
exploiting the two-year panel structure of the CPS, Table 1B tabulates women￿ s occupation in
year 2 conditional on the occupation in year 1 by husband￿ s earnings. Husband￿ s earnings are
grouped into four quartiles. The table lists the occupation mobility of wives sorted by the ￿rst
quartile (lowest earnings) to the fourth quartile (highest earnings). For native married women, we
￿nd that about 8.6-11.6% move from dead-end jobs in year 1 to not working status in year 2. For
immigrant women, we ￿nd the percentage of women transitioning from dead-jobs in year 1 to not
working status in year 2 increases with an increase in husband￿ s earnings: from 9.1% for women
married to husbands with earnings in the ￿rst quartile to 21.1% for those in the fourth quartile.
We ￿nd that the transition probabilities are not sensitive to education or years since migration.
11Table 1B. Wife￿ s Occupation State in Year 2 conditional on that in Year 1 by Husband￿ s Earnings Quartile
Occupation State in Year 2
Not Working Dead-End Career-Oriented Total
Native Immig. Native Immig. Native Immig. Native Immig.
Husband￿ s Earnings in 1st Quartile
Occupation State Not Working 85.4 84.3 6.5 10.7 8.1 5.1 100.0 100.0
in Year 1 Dead-End 9.7 9.1 65.6 77.0 24.8 13.9 100.0 100.0
Career-Oriented 6.2 11.4 9.0 14.1 84.9 74.6 100.0 100.0
Husband￿ s Earnings in 2nd Quartile
Occupation State Not Working 77.4 82.0 9.4 8.2 13.2 9.8 100.0 100.0
in Year 1 Dead-End 8.6 14.4 66.1 66.4 25.4 19.2 100.0 100.0
Career-Oriented 5.2 8.9 7.0 12.0 87.8 79.1 100.0 100.0
Husband￿ s Earnings in 3rd Quartile
Occupation State Not Working 80.6 78.1 6.2 4.8 13.2 17.1 100.0 100.0
in Year 1 Dead-End 9.7 18.5 63.9 61.5 26.4 20.0 100.0 100.0
Career-Oriented 4.8 31.6 5.5 18.4 89.7 50.0 100.0 100.0
Husband￿ s Earnings in 4th Quartile
Occupation State Not Working 82.6 87.5 3.5 5.6 13.9 6.9 100.0 100.0
in Year 1 Dead-End 11.6 21.1 58.7 50.0 29.6 29.0 100.0 100.0
Career-Oriented 7.2 8.4 4.5 3.5 88.3 88.1 100.0 100.0
Table 2 provides summary statistics of own and spouse demographic and family control vari-
ables.11 Occupations are closely related to education. Women working in career-oriented jobs and
their husbands have higher education than others. Immigrant women working in career-oriented
jobs and their husbands have higher education than their native counterparts, but the other groups
of immigrants have lower education that their native counterparts. Native-born and foreign-born
women in career-oriented jobs have 1-2 and 3-4 additional years of education, respectively, than
those who choose not to work or those in dead-end jobs. A similar pattern applies to men.
For both native and immigrant women, husband￿ s earnings and family non-labor income are
highly correlated with the decision to work. These two factors are highest for women who are not
11Table 2 provides summary statistics for families where both husbands and wives are either natives or immigrants,
but the main analysis in section 4 also includes native-immigrant couples.
12working followed by women in career-oriented jobs and dead-end jobs. Husband annual earnings of
women not working are $57,100 and $41,900 for natives and immigrants, which are about $14,000-
17,000 higher than those of women working in dead-end jobs. Family non-labor income of women
not working are $11,340 and $5,420 for natives and immigrants, which is also much larger than
those of women working in dead-end jobs.12
In order to examine di⁄erences based on ethnic origin, we divide the foreign sample into 4
groups: immigrants from Central and South America, from Europe (including Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada), from Asia, and from other countries.13 Among immigrant women, 43%
are from Central and South America, 15% are from Europe, and 38% are from Asia.14 We do not
report summary statistics for the group of the other countries (Africa, Oceania, and unclassi￿ed
ones) due to its small sample size and heterogeneity. In terms of years since migration, women
who are in career-oriented jobs have on average stayed longest in the United States followed those
who are in dead-end jobs and those who are not working. For men there is no signi￿cant pattern.
Among immigrant wives, Central and South American women are most likely to not work (49%)
and to be in dead-end jobs (55%). Asian women are most likely to be in career-oriented jobs
(49%).
12A wife who reported that she was not working may also report non-zero earnings because she may have had
earnings in the previous year while she was not working at the time of interview.
13We combine Australia, New Zealand, and Canada with Europe because of sample size considerations and so
that immigrants from countries that are predominantly white and are at a similar stage of political and economic
development are grouped together. We refer to the group as Europe. The data do not identify mother tongue. The
impact of language pro￿ciency has been studied in a large literature. LaLonde and Topel (1997) provide a survey.
14The numbers do not add to 100% since we exclude the other group of immigrant population.
13Table 2. Summary Statistics
Wife￿ s Occupation State
Not Working Dead-End Career-Oriented Total
Native Immig. Native Immig. Native Immig. Native Immig.
Age 44.13 41.44 42.56 42.87 42.16 43.62 42.69 42.58
(10.42) (10.19) (9.30) (8.20) (9.07) (8.45) (9.48) (9.15)
Husband Age 46.25 44.66 44.74 45.80 44.29 46.56 44.83 45.63
(10.38) (10.21) (9.60) (8.67) (9.45) (8.54) (9.74) (9.28)
Years Since Migration (YSM) 12.68 13.51 15.67 13.94
(9.03) (7.66) (8.70) (8.66)
Husband YSM 15.11 15.10 16.94 15.74
(9.49) (8.10) (8.93) (8.98)
Education 13.16 10.60 12.65 10.33 14.35 14.33 13.81 11.83
(2.34) (4.73) (1.79) (4.26) (2.22) (3.68) (2.30) (4.64)
Husband Education 13.77 11.64 12.90 10.92 14.27 14.88 13.94 12.58
(3.04) (5.22) (2.33) (4.37) (2.53) (4.14) (2.67) (4.94)
Wife Earnings 2.11 1.35 15.94 14.81 30.61 34.20 21.60 16.38
(￿1000 in 2004 dollars) (9.77) (13.59) (13.98) (11.23) (29.49) (38.76) (26.95) (28.74)
Husband Earnings 57.10 41.90 39.68 26.99 52.01 57.01 51.30 43.20
(￿1000 in 2004 dollars) (69.11) (56.36) (38.65) (25.01) (50.58) (68.52) (54.28) (56.22)
Family Non-Labor Income 11.34 5.42 5.66 3.49 7.65 6.22 8.21 5.18
(￿1000 in 2004 dollars) (22.14) (14.71) (13.56) (9.25) (18.29) (17.12) (18.75) (14.47)
# of Children below Age 6 0.42 0.52 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.35
(0.76) (0.75) (0.54) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.63) (0.65)
# of Children below Age 18 1.17 1.52 1.07 1.34 0.99 1.09 1.05 1.32
(1.35) (1.45) (1.19) (1.31) (1.11) (1.10) (1.19) (1.31)
Wife Continent of Origin
Central and South American 0.49 0.55 0.27 0.43
European 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.15
Asian 0.35 0.28 0.49 0.38
N (sample size) 8255 807 5421 558 21246 730 34922 2095
144 A Dynamic Model of Occupation Choices
4.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
This section tests the second testable implication discussed in Section 2. Let Sit be the state of
an individual i in calendar year t. We consider three states: not working (Sit = 0), working in
a dead-end job (Sit = 1), and working in a career-oriented job (Sit = 2). We are interested in a
￿rst-order Markov-switching model that de￿nes a transition probability from state st￿1 to state st
by
pstjst￿1 ￿ Pr[Sit = stjSi;t￿1 = st￿1]; (1)
for st￿1;st 2 f0;1;2g. Suppose that the probability (1) is a function of a vector of covariates, X,







Sit = stjSi;t￿1 = st￿1;Xi;t￿1;￿st￿1
￿
; (2)
for st￿1;st 2 f0;1;2g. For any given state, Si;t￿1 = st￿1, let ￿st￿1 be the vector of parameters.
One may estimate the probabilities by maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Conditional on














For each st￿1 = 0;1;2, we apply a separate maximum likelihood estimation procedure and obtain
the ML estimator, b ￿st￿1;ML. Then the estimated probabilities are




; for st￿1;st 2 f0;1;2g: (3)
We specify a multinomial logit model and apply the maximum likelihood estimation procedure






















; for st = 0;1;2: (4)
A necessary identi￿cation condition is to set ￿stjst￿1 = 0 when st = st￿1, which is the case where an
individual does not change her occupation status between t￿1 and t. We need this identi￿cation
restriction because (3) sum up to one: 1 = b p0jst￿1 (Xi;t￿1)+b p1jst￿1 (Xi;t￿1)+b p2jst￿1 (Xi;t￿1), for each
st￿1 = 0;1;2.
The vector of covariates, Xi;t￿1, includes a constant, age, age squared, education, the number
of children below 6, the number of children below 18, husband￿ s labor income, non-labor family
income, and husband￿ s occupational status.15 All these variables are interacted with a dummy for
immigrants since the impact of these control variables may be di⁄erent across native and foreign-
born women. In addition, years since migration, years since migration squared, country of birth,
and entry year and calendar year dummies are added. The dummy variables of country of birth
and entry year control for di⁄erent skill composition across birth country and entry year cells.
A concern is that there is possible endogeneity due to the inclusion of husband￿ s income,
family non-labor income, and husband￿ s occupation in the model, but there are three reasons
why endogeneity should not be problematic. First, the summary statistics are consistent with the
assumption that husbands are primary workers and wives are secondary workers. We ￿nd that
more than 90% of native and immigrant males participate in the labor market. This implies that
the wife￿ s occupational status is a⁄ected by the labor market outcome of her husband, but not
the other way around. Second, our theory suggests that, to test the FIH, one needs to focus on
low-skilled women. Low-skilled women are more likely to be secondary workers than high-skilled
women. Third, the left hand side variable is from period t whereas the right hand side variables
are from period t￿1. The model errors are likely to be innovations that are realized at t. In sum,
we can assume that most husbands are working and analyze the occupational mobility of wives
conditional on their husband￿ s job zone.
15See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Blau and Kahn (2007) for a survey of female labor supply.
16Another possible concern is that the panel may be to short to evaluate the FIH. However,
it is still true that if at every age and years since migration immigrant women are more credit
constrained than native women, then at every age and years since migration immigrant women
will have a higher likelihood of transitioning from dead-end job to not working if the FIH is at
work. Therefore, testing whether immigrant women have higher transition rates out of dead-end
jobs is a valid way to assess the FIH.
4.2 Empirical Findings









￿0 in (2).16 Table A1 in the Appendix reports the
multinomial logit model estimates, b ￿st￿1. These estimates are not directly interpretable, but give
the signs of the impact of corresponding covariates on the probabilities of moving to other occupa-
tion states. The ￿rst column ￿ From 0￿shows estimates using women who did not work in the ￿rst
year. The second and third columns ￿ From 1￿and ￿ From 2￿show estimates using the sub-sample
of women in dead-end jobs and in career-oriented jobs, respectively, in the ￿rst year. For each of
the regression results, those who stay in the same occupation are the reference group.
The FIH predicts that immigrant women in dead-end jobs are more responsive to increases
in non-labor income than native women in dead-end jobs. In our empirical speci￿cation, the
coe¢ cient of spouse earnings (or family non-labor income) interacted with an immigrant dummy
is expected to be positive signi￿cant for St￿1 = 1 (dead-end jobs). In Table A1, we do ￿nd that
the coe¢ cient estimate of spouse earnings, 0.022, is statistically di⁄erent from zero and large for
St￿1 = 1. This estimate implies a di⁄erential impact of husband￿ s earnings on foreign-born women
relative to native women. For a one dollar increase in husband￿ s earnings, foreign-born women
are more likely to switch from dead-end jobs to not working status relative to native women. In
contrast, the same coe¢ cient estimates for St￿1 = 2 (career-oriented jobs), 0.002, is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero. This implies that immigrant wives in dead-end jobs are more likely to quit
working with an increase in their spousal labor income than natives in dead-end jobs and that
16We estimate the same model using attrition-correcting weights and ￿nd qualitatively the same results. The
results are not presented, but are available upon request.
17immigrants in career-oriented jobs are not.
To understand the meanings of the coe¢ cient estimates, we turn to the implied function esti-
mates. We analyze the immigrant-native di⁄erences in transition probabilities from one state to










. Since the functions are non-linear
and multi-dimensional, we evaluate the di⁄erences in transition probabilities at some selected
points. More speci￿cally, we consider hypothetical immigrant couples from Central and South
America, Europe, and Asia entering the United States at age 24 (wife) and 27 (husband) in year
1990. We follow them for the next 24 years until they become 48 and 51 years old, respectively.
We assume that they have their ￿rst child between ages (24,27) and (30,33) and have a second
child between ages (30,33) and (36,39). Both wife and husband are assumed to have 12 years of
education.
The hypothetical husbands work in career-oriented jobs. We also assume husband￿ s earnings
and family non-labor income for this hypothetical couple to be the age-occupation speci￿c income
averages over the native population. For example, for couples of ages 30 (wife) and 33 (husband)
and men working in career-oriented jobs, husband￿ s earnings and family non-labor income are
evaluated at $48,670 and $2,680, respectively. The evaluation values are ($60,180,$3,990) and
($63,860,$5,480) as these couples become (36,39) and (42,45) ages old.
The upper panel of Table 3 reports the transition probability estimates from state 1 (dead-end
jobs) to each of the three occupation states evaluated at the above control variables. The table
reports the probability estimates evaluated at 6, 12, and 18 years since migration. The lower panel
of Table 3 presents the foreign-native di⁄erence in the reported probabilities in the upper panel.
The probabilities of transitioning from state 0 (not working) and from state 2 (career-oriented
jobs) are presented in the Appendix. Overall, we do not ￿nd much immigrant-native di⁄erence in
the transition probabilities of those who do not work or who work in career-oriented jobs in year
1.





Native C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.13￿￿￿ 0.55￿￿￿ 0.32￿￿￿ 0.16 0.53￿￿￿ 0.31￿￿ 0.19 0.44￿￿￿ 0.36￿￿ 0.08 0.46￿￿￿ 0.46￿￿￿
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.15)
(36;39;12) 0.11￿￿￿ 0.59￿￿￿ 0.30￿￿￿ 0.52￿￿￿ 0.33￿￿ 0.15 0.58￿￿￿ 0.26￿ 0.16 0.33￿ 0.38￿￿￿ 0.29￿
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)
(42;45;18) 0.08￿￿￿ 0.64￿￿￿ 0.28￿￿￿ 0.63￿￿ 0.22 0.15 0.69￿￿￿ 0.16 0.15 0.43 0.26 0.31











C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.14
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.15)
(36;39;12) 0.40** -0.26* -0.15 0.47** -0.33** -0.14 0.22 -0.21 -0.01
(0.20) (0.15) (0.10) (0.21) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)
(42;45;18) 0.55** -0.43** -0.13 0.61** -0.48*** -0.13 0.35 -0.38** 0.03
(0.27) (0.17) (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.17) (0.31) (0.18) (0.25)
From the upper panel of Table 3, the estimates in the ￿rst three columns (Native) and the ￿rst
row are 0.13, 0.55, and 0.32. The estimates are all signi￿cant at the 1% level. These estimates
imply that for native women (30 years old, high school graduates, and not working) married to
native men (33 years old, high school graduates, working in career-oriented jobs with national
average earnings conditional on age and occupation), 13% are likely to not work, 55% are likely
to work in dead-end jobs, and 32% are likely to work in career-oriented jobs in the following year.
The corresponding estimates for Central and South Americans are 0.16, 0.53, and 0.31. The
last two estimates are statistically signi￿cant. The point estimates suggest that for Central and
South American women (30 years old, 6 years since migration, high school graduates, and not
working) married to Central and South American men (33 years old, 6 years since migration, high
school graduates, working in career-oriented jobs with national average earnings conditional on
19age and occupation), 16% are likely to not work, 53% are likely to work in dead-end jobs, and 31%
are likely to work in career-oriented jobs in the following year.
The second row calculates the transition probabilities for women (36 years old, 12 years since
migration if immigrant, high school graduates, and not working) and men (39 years old, 12 years
since migration if immigrant, high school graduates, not working with national average earnings
conditional on age). These transition probabilities are shown graphically in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c.
Figure 1a suggests that, with age or years since migration, immigrant women working in dead-end
jobs are more likely to drop out of the labor force than native women. These short-term transition
patterns suggest that immigrant women in dead-end jobs are more likely to leave the labor force
than native women over the longer-term. According to Figure 1b, immigrant women working in
dead-end jobs are less likely to stay in dead-end jobs than their native counterparts. Again, these
short-term transition patterns suggest that fewer immigrant women will work in dead-end jobs
than native women over the longer-term.
To determine whether the immigrant-native gaps are statistically signi￿cant, we examine the
lower panel of Table 3. The lower panel of Table 3 reports the immigrant-native di⁄erence in the
state transition probabilities. These estimates correspond to the di⁄erence between the probability
for each group of immigrants and that of natives in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. According to the lower
panel of Table 3, the immigrant-native di⁄erence in transition probability from dead-end job to not
working for women from Central and South America and Europe becomes statistically signi￿cant
at the 5% level at 12 and 18 years since migration. For women from Asia, the di⁄erence is not
signi￿cant, but the sign of the estimate is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Overall we
￿nd, conditional on being in a dead-end job in year 1, with an increase in years since migration,
immigrant women decrease their participation in the labor force relative to native women and
this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant. The probability of being in dead-end jobs also decreases
signi￿cantly with an increase in years since migration; this is evidence in favor of the FIH. This
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Figure 1c. Transition Probabilities from 1 to 2
A robustness check for the test is to look at mixed couples, such as immigrant women married
to native men or native women married to immigrant men. We predict that immigrant women
married to native men will behave like native women in native couples because their families are
expected to be less credit-constrained than immigrant couples. Similarly, native women married
to immigrant men will behave di⁄erent from native women in native couples because their families
21are expected to be more credit-constrained than native couples.












, from St￿1 = 1 (Dead-End Jobs) to St
C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.25 -0.04 -0.21** -0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.21 -0.06 -0.15
(0.22) (0.20) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.10)
(36;39;12) 0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.06 -0.17 0.10
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.05) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19)
(42;45;18) -0.01 -0.47** 0.49* -0.07*** -0.49** 0.55*** -0.03 -0.52*** 0.56***












, from St￿1 = 1 (Dead-End Jobs) to St
C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) -0.07 0.11 -0.04 -0.11*** -0.17 0.28 -0.13*** 0.21 -0.07
(0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.04) (0.22) (0.22) (0.02) (0.25) (0.25)
(36;39;12) 0.25 0.00 -0.24*** 0.13 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11*** 0.34*** -0.23**
(0.29) (0.27) (0.07) (0.27) (0.26) (0.19) (0.01) (0.10) (0.10)
(42;45;18) 0.37 -0.10 -0.27*** 0.28 -0.04 -0.24*** -0.08*** 0.35*** -0.27***
(0.53) (0.53) (0.03) (0.52) (0.50) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Tables 4 is analogous to the lower panel of Table 3, but list the di⁄erences in transition prob-
abilities between women in mixed couples. The upper panel of Table 4 presents the foreign-native
di⁄erence in transition probabilities for foreign-born women married to native-born men condi-
tional on these women having dead-end jobs in year 1. We do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence
in occupation mobility from 1 to 0 between foreign-born women married to native-born men and
22native-born women married to native-born men. These foreign-born women also decrease their
participation in dead-end jobs with increased stay in the United States but they transition to
career-oriented jobs instead of not working status. In the lower panel of Table 4, we ￿nd that
the transition probabilities for native women married to immigrant men are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from those for native women married to native men, although the signs are di⁄erent from our
prediction.
This robustness check is useful because in BB (1997), mixed couples are used to disentangle
immigrant speci￿c unobserved characteristics from the FIH. Drawbacks of this analysis include
the fact that selection into marriage is not random. Immigrants or natives in mixed couples may
be di⁄erent from average immigrants and natives. In addition, there is potential for bias since the
sample sizes of mixed families are quite small. Nonetheless, our ￿ndings are consistent with the
FIH.
5 Evidence from a Model of Hours Worked
This section tests the ￿rst implication discussed in Section 2. We replicate BB (1997) and BKMS
(2003) using our sample. They estimate a common model given by
Hit = x
0
















+ kt + uit;
where for individual i in year t, Hit is annual hours worked in the previous year, ￿Wc and ￿Hc are
￿xed e⁄ects for immigrants who entered in period c for wives and husbands, ysmW
it and ysmH
it are
years since migration for wives and husbands, kt is a common year e⁄ect, and xit is a vector of
control variables. The control variables include education for wives and husbands, the number of
children, and dummy variables that indicate country of birth and year of entry. Table 5 reports
estimation results. IM7579 and IM7680 are the coe¢ cients for dummies for immigrants who
entered in years 1975-1979 and 1976-1980, respectively.
23Table 5. Assimilation Pro￿les of Hours of Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selected Covariates BB (1997) BKMS (2003) CPS Full Sample CPS Dead End
YSM, wife 28.779 25.207 51.820 41.582
(10.780) (2.170) (23.116) (58.259)
YSM2, wife ￿ 0.244 ￿ 0.416 ￿ 0.440 ￿ 0.879
(0.159) (0.036) (0.577) (1.399)
YSM, husband ￿ 38.874 ￿ 2.054 ￿ 21.176 ￿ 76.895
(10.982) (2.233) (24.752) (61.714)
YSM2, husband 0.334 ￿ 0.043 0.103 1.807
(0.158) (0.036) (0.594) (1.498)
￿￿￿
IM7579 or IM7680, wife ￿ 338.155 ￿ 264.592 76.703 96.586
(98.301) (19.893) (180.697) (491.092)
IM7579 or IM7680, husband 560.985 51.897 168.710 363.556
(99.900) (20.730) (190.821) (521.092)
￿￿￿
N 34,445 650,266 75,968 6,166
The results from BB and BKMS are reported in the ￿rst and second columns of Table 5,
respectively. The third column reports the same model estimates using the matched March CPS
for 1996-2002.17 In the fourth column, we restrict our sample to women who work in dead-end jobs
in the ￿rst year of the panel and replace Hit with Hi;t+1 to make it consistent with the dynamic
labor supply model. Using the estimates in Table 5, one can obtain hours pro￿les for immigrant
women relative to native women. The four columns are depicted in four lines in Figure 2.
17Instead of English skill indicator, we use continent of origin since this information is not provided in the CPS
data. We do not include race indicators, but add continent of origin indicators with immigrants from Central and
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BB (1997) BKMS (2003) CPS-FS CPS-DE
Figure 2. Annual Hours Worked for Immigrant Women relative to Native Women
First of all, Figure 2 shows the contrasting hours assimilation pro￿les obtained by BB and
BKMS. The former ￿nd immigrant women reduce their work hours with continued stay in Canada,
while the latter ￿nd the opposite for the U.S. case. The two hours assimilation pro￿les correspond-
ing to BB and BKMS are reproduced from Figure 1 of BKMS. We add two more pro￿les obtained
using our sample. Our full sample (CPS-FS) results produce a pro￿le that is similar to the one
obtained by BKMS. This is due to similar estimates of own and spouse years since migration
obtained by the Census and the CPS in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. They are common in that
the negative impact of husband￿ s years since migration is not strong enough to o⁄set the positive
impact of wife￿ s years since migration.
A striking ￿nding is that once our sample is restricted to women who work in dead-end jobs
(CPS-DE), we ￿nd that the negative impact of the husband￿ s years since migration dominates the
positive impact of wife￿ s years since migration on work hours, which is similar to BB (see columns
251 and 4). The hours assimilation pro￿le of wives who work in dead-end jobs, as shown in Figure 2,
indicate that these women work more than natives on arrival, but decrease their work hours over
the years.18
This is consistent with the ￿rst testable implication in Section 2. It is also consistent with the
evidence we ￿nd for occupational mobility of immigrant women relative to their native counter-
parts: immigrant women working in dead-end jobs are more likely to transition to not working
status relative to natives and immigrant women working in career-oriented jobs do not have this
tendency. A caveat is that our replication results for the restricted sample of women in dead-end
jobs su⁄er from small sample size and are not statistically signi￿cant. Nevertheless, our replication
results suggest that the results of BKMS may change when the sample is con￿ned to women in
dead-end jobs.
The results in column 4 cannot be reproduced by using the Census sample because a panel
sample is necessary for our analysis.19 However, a possible concern is whether our results are driven
by the fact that Hit is replaced with Hi;t+1. To verify that it is not the case, Figure 3 presents the
Hi;t+1 results. CPS-T2 uses the same speci￿cation and data as CPS-FS except that it uses Hi;t+1
rather than Hit. Similar to BKMS or CPS-FS, the CPS-T2 line is an increasing function of years
since migration. We ￿nd the same tendency when the sample is con￿ned to women who work in
career-oriented jobs (CPS-CO). Only CPS-DE is downward sloping, which is consistent with the
theory.
18Cohen-Goldner, Gotlibovski, and Kahana (2009a) provide theoretical explanation about why BB and BKMS
may ￿nd contradictory results, but they do not provide empirical evidence.
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Figure 3. Annual Hours Worked for Immigrant Women relative to Native Women by
Job Type
While the testable implications developed in Section 2 explicitly make predictions on the labor
supply of women in low-skilled and high-skilled jobs, a possible concern would be whether the
use of this grouping favors our test. For example, immigrant women in jobs with lower SVP may
have systematically fewer opportunities for upward mobility than do natives and thus have less
incentive to remain in the labor force. To check this point, we introduce grouping by education as
a more neutral measure of skills. Figure 4 illustrates results by three education groups (less than
high school, high school, and college and above), and we ￿nd that the least educated immigrant
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Figure 4. Annual Hours Worked for Immigrant Women relative to Native Women by
Education Level
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a novel test for the FIH. We formally specify a two-period labor supply
model of heterogeneous married women. This model provides two testable implications for the
occupation choices and work hours of married women. To test the implication for occupation
choices, we employ a ￿rst-order Markov switching model and analyze the dynamic feature of
occupation choices. We ￿nd that immigrant women working in dead-end jobs are more likely to
drop out of the labor force than their native counterparts, which is consistent with the prediction.
We ￿nd that husband￿ s earnings play a key role in this dynamics. Evidence from mixed couples
provides further support of the FIH.
To test the implication for work hours, we replicate the existing model used in previous papers
28using our sample. We ￿rst show that the U.S. census and the CPS share similar patterns. That
is the CPS results are very similar to BKMS when the entire sample is used. Then we show
that the conventional results get reversed when the CPS sample is con￿ned to women working in
dead-end jobs. This is consistent with the prediction that women in credit-constrained households
work longer hours upon arrival and decrease labor supply with time spent in the United States.
Our results suggest that the increasing annual hours worked with years since migration found in
previous U.S. studies used to reject the FIH are driven by the labor supply of women working in
career-oriented jobs.
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31Table A1-1. Multinomial Coe¢ cient Estimates
From St￿1 = 0 From St￿1 = 1 From St￿1 = 2
To St = 1 To St = 2 To St = 0 To St = 2 To St = 0 To St = 1
Husband in dead-end job 0.246 0.741*** -0.294 0.070 -0.509*** 0.098
(0.187) (0.173) (0.182) (0.145) (0.140) (0.131)
Husband in career-oriented job 0.103 0.912*** -0.308* 0.326** -0.361*** -0.119
(0.182) (0.158) (0.178) (0.141) (0.121) (0.124)
Husband in dead-end*Imm. -0.479 -0.931 -0.259 0.229 0.023 0.762
(0.634) (0.615) (0.548) (0.553) (0.624) (0.708)
Husband in career-oriented*Imm. 0.272 -0.868 -0.418 0.299 -0.208 0.175
(0.618) (0.577) (0.576) (0.564) (0.572) (0.693)
Age 0.126** 0.072 -0.216*** -0.055 -0.192*** -0.057
(0.064) (0.049) (0.061) (0.046) (0.042) (0.043)
Age squared -0.002*** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Husband age -0.065 -0.085* -0.071 0.016 -0.050 0.049
(0.063) (0.050) (0.061) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042)
Husband age squared 0.001 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Age * Imm. 0.426** -0.060 -0.048 -0.062 0.125 0.112
(0.194) (0.169) (0.172) (0.148) (0.175) (0.174)
Age squared * Imm. -0.005** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Husband age *Imm. -0.240 0.043 0.247 -0.130 0.181 -0.009
(0.179) (0.168) (0.175) (0.147) (0.175) (0.194)
Husband age squared*Imm. 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years since migration (YSM) -0.104 0.239 -0.047 0.127 0.512** -0.102
(0.247) (0.255) (0.272) (0.245) (0.234) (0.221)
YSM squared 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.018*** 0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Husband YSM -0.069 -0.126 0.533* -0.144 -0.565** 0.077
(0.253) (0.271) (0.310) (0.255) (0.229) (0.247)
Husband YSM squared 0.001 -0.002 -0.015** -0.003 0.016*** -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Education -0.066** 0.162*** -0.075** 0.105*** -0.150*** -0.288***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017)
Husband Education -0.025 -0.009 0.024 0.009 0.023 -0.038**
(0.023) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Education*Imm. 0.094* -0.052 0.036 -0.010 0.005 0.141***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044)
Husband education*Imm. -0.026 -0.017 -0.030 -0.039 -0.026 0.048
(0.048) (0.045) (0.052) (0.046) (0.042) (0.043)
Number of children below age 6 -0.418*** -0.325*** 0.318*** 0.071 0.223*** -0.066
(0.084) (0.061) (0.099) (0.072) (0.061) (0.065)
Number of children below age 18 0.119*** 0.048 0.067 -0.006 0.058* 0.057*
(0.043) (0.035) (0.051) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032)
# of children below age 6*Imm. 0.416* -0.088 -0.086 -0.496 -0.087 0.468*
(0.224) (0.251) (0.306) (0.302) (0.293) (0.269)
# of children below age 18*Imm. -0.030 0.051 -0.220 -0.042 -0.091 -0.188
(0.126) (0.128) (0.151) (0.122) (0.151) (0.142)
Husband￿ s income -0.006*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Husband￿ s income*Imm. -0.001 0.003 0.022*** 0.010* 0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Family non-labor income -0.023*** -0.004* 0.004 0.005** 0.004*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Family non-labor income*Imm. 0.015 -0.007 -0.010 0.010 -0.010 -0.022
(0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
Dummy Variables
Calendar Year Yes Yes Yes
Country of Origin Yes Yes Yes
Wife & Husband Entry Year Yes Yes Yes
Family Type Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 9331 6166 22487
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Con￿dence levels: 99% (￿￿￿); 95% (￿￿); 90% (￿):





Native C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.77￿￿￿ 0.10￿￿￿ 0.13￿￿￿ 0.79￿￿￿ 0.17￿￿ 0.04 0.84￿￿￿ 0.11 0.05 0.82￿￿￿ 0.14￿￿ 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
(36;39;12) 0.80￿￿￿ 0.09￿￿￿ 0.12￿￿￿ 0.84￿￿￿ 0.09￿￿ 0.07￿ 0.85￿￿￿ 0.05 0.09 0.85￿￿￿ 0.07￿ 0.08￿
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
(42;45;18) 0.78￿￿￿ 0.09￿￿￿ 0.13￿￿￿ 0.78￿￿￿ 0.03 0.18 0.76￿￿￿ 0.02 0.22 0.77￿￿￿ 0.02 0.20











C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.02 0.08 -0.10*** 0.07 0.01 -0.08** 0.05 0.04 -0.09***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
(36;39;12) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
(42;45;18) 0.01 -0.06* 0.05 -0.02 -0.07*** 0.09 -0.01 -0.07** 0.08
(0.15) (0.03) (0.15) (0.18) (0.02) (0.19) (0.16) (0.03) (0.17)





Native C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) 0.07￿￿￿ 0.12￿￿￿ 0.81￿￿￿ 0.06 0.27￿￿ 0.67￿￿￿ 0.08 0.17￿ 0.75￿￿￿ 0.08 0.15￿￿ 0.76￿￿￿
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
(36;39;12) 0.06￿￿￿ 0.12￿￿￿ 0.82￿￿￿ 0.04 0.27￿￿ 0.69￿￿￿ 0.05 0.17￿ 0.78￿￿￿ 0.06 0.15￿ 0.79￿￿￿
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
(42;45;18) 0.05￿￿￿ 0.12￿￿￿ 0.83￿￿￿ 0.02 0.23 0.75￿￿￿ 0.02 0.14 0.84￿￿￿ 0.03 0.13 0.85￿￿￿











C.S. America Europe Asia
St : 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
(30;33;6) -0.01 0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.04
(0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
(36;39;12) -0.02 0.15 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
(42;45;18) -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.17) (0.17) (0.03) (0.12) (0.13) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11)
33